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THE HELTER SKELTER APPLICATION OF THE REVERSE 
PIERCING DOCTRINE 
Michael Richardson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The essence of the corporate form is that it offers financial protection 
to the parties involved.  Individuals wishing to begin a business can do 
so without putting themselves at risk of substantial personal liability.  
Likewise, corporations can secure financing through outside 
shareholders without concern that the misdeeds and misfortunes of their 
equitable owners will create problems.  This desire for protection 
reflects the reality that creditors, both voluntary and involuntary, will 
seek to attach any assets they are legally able to in order to satisfy the 
debts owed them. 
This continuing conflict between debtors hiding behind the shield of 
the corporate form and their creditors has resulted in substantial case law 
on piercing the corporate veil.  In the prototypical case, a creditor with a 
right to the assets of an undercapitalized corporation seeks to execute 
against the assets of the party who owns and controls the corporation.1  
If the owner has intentionally abused the corporate form to profit 
excessively and shield himself from loss while disregarding the 
possibility of harm to third parties, the theory holds that this creditor 
should collect from the owner as if he and the corporation were one.  
This practice, while tightly regulated, is widely accepted. 
Less frequently, parties will try to pierce the corporate veil “in 
reverse.”  “Outsider” reverse piercing occurs when a party with a claim 
against an individual or corporation attempts to be repaid with assets of 
a corporation owned or substantially controlled by the defendant.2  In 
doing so, plaintiffs attempt to increase the ease of collecting on their 
 * Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank Professor Barbara Black for her feedback and comments on this subject matter, as well as 
Shawn Weyrich for her constant encouragement, support, and feedback. 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. In “insider” reverse piercing, by contrast, the controlling members will attempt to ignore the 
corporate fiction in order to take advantage of a benefit available to the corporation, such as an interest 
in a lawsuit or protection of personal assets.  For a more complete analysis of the distinction between 
insider and outsider reverse piercing, see Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying 
Appropriate Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33 (1990).  Outsider reverse piercing is the subject of the present 
analysis, and references to reverse piercing hereinafter will refer to the outsider form unless specified. 
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judgment by skipping the intermediary step of seizing the defendant’s 
interest in the corporation.3  Outsider reverse piercing flips the 
traditional doctrine on its head by contemplating the seizure of corporate 
assets in a suit against an owner. 
What remains unsettled is how courts should handle the reverse 
situation, where a corporation is held responsible for the debts and 
misdeeds of its shareholder.  At first glance, reverse piercing of the 
corporate veil appears to require the same examination as traditional 
piercing.4  As such, with the notable exception of the Tenth Circuit,5 
reverse piercing grew to become increasingly accepted by state and 
federal courts, often applying the same analysis.6  On the other hand, 
this simplified application of a distinct concept may be what Cardozo 
warned of when he said “[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, 
for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving 
it.”7  What do the two versions of piercing the corporate veil have in 
common, other than a metaphor?  In what ways is applying liability to a 
corporation different than from an individual?  How are the relevant 
parties affected?  Is reverse piercing necessary, or are there alternative 
means of achieving the same end?  If the doctrine is to have prospective 
application, its relation to traditional veil piercing must be more closely 
examined. 
Outsider reverse piercing is supported by an analogy that breaks down 
under scrutiny due to the different set of affected parties and the strength 
of their interests.  Other jurisdictions should follow the Tenth Circuit’s 
lead and abandon it.8  The purpose of this Comment is to examine 
judicial application of the reverse piercing doctrine, from its beginnings 
to the changes of the past few decades, as well as the underlying 
reasoning presented by the courts for or against its application.  After 
providing a detailed analysis of traditional piercing of the corporate veil 
in Part II, Part III illustrates how reverse piercing is handled by the 
courts—from an identical analysis borrowed from traditional piercing to 
a refusal to apply it and every gradation in between.  Part IV uses the 
 3. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the traditional judgment collection methods). 
 4. See Kurtis A. Kemper, Acceptance and Application of Reverse Veil Piercing, 2 A.L.R. 6th 
195 (2005) (“[R]everse piercing of the corporate veil . . . and traditional piercing . . . are viewed by the 
courts as opposite sides of the same coin.  The same considerations are usually at issue regardless of 
which direction a third party attempts to reach through the veil.”). 
 5. See infra Part III.B (discussing the doctrine as it has developed within the Tenth Circuit). 
 6. See infra Part III.A. 
 7. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). 
 8. This has occurred to some extent, as jurisdictions have adopted the reasoning of Tenth 
Circuit cases on reverse piercing.  See, e.g., Acree v. McMahan, 585 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. 2003).  As the 
following sections will show, however, this adoption is far from uniform. 
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multiple factors enumerated by the courts to analyze the reverse piercing 
doctrine’s appropriateness as an equitable remedy as well as its 
responsiveness to the rights of plaintiffs, defendants, shareholders, and 
third-party creditors.  Part V concludes that reverse piercing is too 
dangerous to innocent parties to be preferred over existing judgment 
collection tools and should thus be abandoned by all jurisdictions. 
II. TRADITIONAL PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL—BACKGROUND 
It is a basic concept of corporate law that corporations are legal 
entities separate from their shareholders.  In fact, this distancing of 
individual from corporation has been referred to as the cornerstone of 
American business law under the common law, allowing for individuals 
to engage in business while limiting their personal liability should the 
corporation fail.9  Given the importance of the fiction of the corporation, 
courts are understandably reluctant to pierce the corporate veil except in 
extreme circumstances.  Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that piercing 
of the corporate veil is allowed where maintaining the corporate fiction 
would create an unjust result.10  Where exactly this line should be 
drawn, however, is unclear and varies widely, making piercing of the 
corporate veil one of the most frequently litigated issues in corporate 
law.11 
The relevant factors and typical scenarios are evident in an example 
where piercing was permitted.  In NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC 
Communications, LLC,12 LHC Communications (LHC) and its primary 
investor Laurence Zimmerman were sued for breach of contract and 
unsettled accounts.  LHC was one of many companies started and fully 
funded by Zimmerman, who used it to invest in various communications 
and internet technology companies.13  NetJets contracted with 
Zimmerman, through LHC, to provide use of an airplane and related 
 9. See, e.g., De Breceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc., 828 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 10. Much criticism remains, however, about the consistency of its application, particularly when 
applied to limited liability entities.  See, e.g., David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial 
Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305 (2007). 
 11. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
1036 (1991). 
 12. 537 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2008).  This case dealt with collection against a limited liability 
company rather than a corporation.  The court, however, found that LLCs have “limited liability akin to 
the corporate form” and analyzed piercing in a manner indistinguishable from its application to 
corporations, including citing authorities which referred only to corporations.  Id. at 176 (quoting Elf 
Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999)); id. (citing Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns 
Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992)). 
 13. Id. at 179. 
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services.14  Zimmerman invested and withdrew money from LHC at will 
in informal transactions demarcated “loans” before LHC became 
undercapitalized and stopped doing business altogether.15  At the time, 
over $300,000 in costs incurred were still owed to NetJets.16  After 
noting that Zimmerman used the company as his alter ego17 by 
intermingling its funds with his own and not observing corporate 
formalities, the court stated there was sufficient evidence that LHC had 
become undercapitalized through unjustified withdrawals by and 
purchases on behalf of Zimmerman.18  This fact pattern, and the legal 
analysis applied by the courts, is typical of veil piercing cases. 
Courts determining the appropriateness of disregarding the corporate 
form do so based on a number of factors that can be divided roughly into 
two prongs: control and equity.19  First, a plaintiff is required to 
demonstrate that the person from which relief is sought had domination 
of the corporation whose veil would be pierced.  Sometimes termed 
instrumentality, this is a central factor in piercing and the reason why the 
“alter ego” doctrine is the label sometimes used interchangeably with 
piercing.20  Determining control can involve a look at the corporation’s 
diversity of ownership, intermingling of corporate assets with those of 
another person, and the observance of corporate formalities.21  This can 
readily apply both to the relationship between a parent corporation and 
its subsidiary or one or more owners of a close corporation.  In NetJets, 
the corporation had a single shareholder, observed very few corporate 
formalities, and intermingled its profits with the funds of its owner, all 
evidencing Zimmerman’s control. 
Secondly, the injury alleged must result from utilizing corporate 
control for a fraudulent, illegal, or otherwise inequitable purpose.22  This 
 14. Id. at 172. 
 15. Id. at 183. 
 16. Id. at 173. 
 17. The term “alter ego” applies in corporate law to a situation where the corporation is “a mere 
instrumentality” of a controlling party so that the acts of one may be imputed on the other.  XL Vision, 
LLC v. Holloway, 856 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Bellairs v. Mohrmann, 716 
So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).  Determination of alter ego status is highly intertwined with 
the control prong and is sometimes treated as an independent test.  See infra notes 81–91 and 
accompanying text. 
 18. NetJets, 537 F.3d at 184. 
 19. See, e.g., Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Lay-Com, Inc., 580 F.3d 602, 610 (7th Cir. 2009).  This 
of course is a great simplification of a complex, multi-factor analysis.  Even wide ranging tests, 
however, such as the twelve-factor analysis employed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jon-T 
Chemicals, Inc. can be broadly grouped and separated according to these prongs.  768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 
1985). 
 20. See, e.g., XL Vision, 856 So. 2d at 1066. 
 21. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 22. See, e.g., NetJets, 537 F.3d at 177. 
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may take the form of undercapitalization or fraudulent conveyance23 in 
the most typical cases.  NetJets is a typical case of fraudulent 
conveyance by the owner under the guise of personal loans, resulting in 
undercapitalization and refusal to pay established debts.  After canceling 
his contract with NetJets, Zimmerman withdrew from the company an 
amount greater than that owed to NetJets, proving that the corporate 
assets were sufficient to pay the debt before Zimmerman’s 
interference.24 
While the common law determination for piercing the corporate veil 
is far from settled and uniform, the two-prong analysis provides an 
accurate paraphrase of the evaluation conducted by some jurisdictions,25 
and a summary of the factors used in others.26  The standard has 
developed to examine the unique facets of a traditional piercing.  The 
central question is whether the corporation has taken particular actions 
that amount to a waiver of the corporate veil’s protection of 
shareholders.  In developing a corresponding framework for dealing 
with reverse piercing, courts would be required to determine how to shift 
the focus to the actions of the individual as they affect the rights of the 
corporation, its shareholders, and its creditors.  As Parts III and IV will 
show below, this altered focus has been slow to develop or ignored 
altogether. 
 23. While “fraudulent conveyance” is used here to refer generally to secreting or misuse of 
assets, it should be noted that fraudulent conveyance is its own term of art describing a creditor’s 
remedy for dishonest distribution of assets, particularly in the context of bankruptcy.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548 (2006).  For criticism of reverse piercing used as a shortcut to achieve the same end, see infra 
notes 141–146 and accompanying text. 
 24. NetJets, 537 F.3d at 184. 
 25. See, e.g., Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 1086 
(Ohio 1993) (“[T]he corporate form may be disregarded and individual shareholders held liable for 
corporate misdeeds when (1) control over the corporation by those to be held liable was so complete that 
the corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence of its own, (2) control over the corporation by 
those to be held liable was exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the 
person seeking to disregard the corporate entity, and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff 
from such control and wrong.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Water Whole Int’l Corp., 302 F. App’x 789, 793 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the factors include “‘(1) whether the dominant corporation owns or subscribes to all the 
subservient corporation’s stock, (2) whether the dominant and subservient corporations have common 
directors and officers, (3) whether the dominant corporation provides financing to the subservient 
corporation, (4) whether the subservient corporation is grossly undercapitalized, (5) whether the 
dominant corporation pays the salaries, expenses or losses of the subservient corporation, (6) whether 
most of the subservient corporation’s business is with the dominant corporation or the subservient 
corporation’s assets were conveyed from the dominant corporation, (7) whether the dominant 
corporation refers to the subservient corporation as a division or department, (8) whether the subservient 
corporation’s officers or directors follow the dominant corporation’s directions, and (9) whether the 
corporations observe the legal formalities for keeping the entities separate.’” (quoting Gilbert v. Sec. 
Fin. Corp. of Okla., 152 P.3d 165, 175 (Okla. 2006)). 
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III. REVERSE PIERCING—DEVELOPMENT AND DIVERGENCE IN CASE LAW 
Reverse piercing claims are rooted in the 1929 case of Kingston Dry 
Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transportation Co.27  Kingston, following 
repairs made by the request of the defendant, Lake Champlain 
Transportation, looked to collect debts owed by attaching the assets of a 
subsidiary of the defendant.28 
The Second Circuit came out strongly against the application of the 
veil piercing doctrine in reverse.  To begin, there was nothing beyond a 
shared set of directors to show that the subsidiary had participated 
sufficiently in the action giving rise to the debt to create liability, much 
less controlled the parent company.29  The court went so far as to say 
that reverse piercing would be appropriate only in rare circumstances, if 
ever.30  In dwelling upon the infrequency with which control by a 
subsidiary could be found, the court implicitly recognized that a 
traditional veil piercing analysis is inapplicable.31 
While this would appear to signal a developing break in the common 
law between traditional and reverse piercing, the Second Circuit rooted 
its decision entirely in the traditional analysis, citing its decision in 
Costan v. Manila Electric Co.32 to show that the central element was the 
issue of control.33  Proceeding through this lens, the court looked at the 
level of control that the subsidiary had, particularly its influence on its 
parent company with regard to the specific action giving rise to the debt 
at issue.34  As there was no evidence of the subsidiary intervening in the 
actions of its parent or attempting to make the parent an agent of the 
subsidiary, the court reasoned, there was no control exercised by the 
subsidiary, and reverse piercing would be inappropriate.35 
The court failed to conduct a full analysis of how closely reverse 
piercing cases resembled their traditional counterparts, and to what 
extent the same interests were involved.  In so doing, Judge Learned 
Hand provided muddled reasoning that presaged the reverse piercing 
debate that exists to this day.  In the eighty years since Kingston, 
jurisdictions have distinguished themselves based on whether they apply 
old tests to unique facts (as in Kingston), look at reverse piercing as a 
 27. 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 28. Id. at 265. 
 29. Id. at 267. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 24 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 33. Kingston, 31 F.2d at 267. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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wholly distinct (and perhaps misguided) concept, or fall somewhere in 
between. 
The remainder of this Part outlines the factors considered and tests 
applied in these cases.  Subpart A will look at examples of courts strictly 
applying the traditional two-prong test.  Subpart B will look at the 
opposite trend: courts ruling out any application of reverse piercing.  
Finally, Subpart C will explore the wide range of factors and 
considerations applied by other jurisdictions.  This will set the stage for 
Part IV’s analysis of the best approach to reverse piercing. 
A. The Two-Prong Test—The Emergence of Reverse Piercing 
One of the first jurisdictions to embrace the practice of reverse 
piercing was the State of Washington following its Supreme Court’s 
decision in W.G. Platts v. Platts.36  In Platts, Beatrice Platts obtained by 
attachment land owned by the plaintiff corporation according to a 
divorce settlement between Beatrice and Willard Platts.37  The dispute 
arose when this lien was challenged by the corporation.38  The court 
cited to the ruling precedent in the jurisdiction regarding traditional 
piercing of the corporate veil and applied its two-prong test without 
alteration.39  The court found that Willard did “control and use the 
corporation as a tool or instrument for carrying out his own plans and 
purposes,” justifying liability.40  Unlike Kingston, the Platts court did 
not specifically require that the controlled corporation be somehow 
involved in the conduct that was the subject matter of the suit.41  While 
the equity prong was applied, it had a unique application in this case 
because Willard had agreed to the attachment during negotiations over 
the divorce settlement, treating the corporation as a marital asset.42  
Therefore, the court reasoned, it would be unconscionable to use the 
corporate form as a shield relieving him of agreed to obligations.43 
Strict adherence to the two-prong test is perhaps most clearly present 
 36. 298 P.2d 1107 (Wash. 1956). 
 37. Id. at 1108. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1110–11 (citing Platt v. Bradner Co., 230 P. 633 (Wash. 1924)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. But cf. Ackerman v. Sobol Family P’ship, LLP, No. CV030826123, 2004 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 1270 (Conn. Super. May 12, 2004) (dismissing a reverse piercing claim that failed to allege 
sufficiently that the corporation, acting under the control of the individual defendant, was the source of 
the inequity). 
 42. Platts, 298 P.2d at 1108.  Willard refuted that he had actually agreed, but the court found 
otherwise based on documentation from the lower court.  Id. 
 43. Id. at 1111. 
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in New York, which routinely follows the precedent established in State 
v. Easton.44  Following a $7.5 million judgment against Karl Easton for 
Medicare fraud,45 the State of New York attempted to attach the assets 
of two corporations, Cobble Hill Center Corp. and the 3 Lafayette 
Avenue Corp., allegedly controlled by Easton.46  Although no New 
York precedent at that time had clearly established reverse piercing, the 
Easton court felt that “conceptually ‘reverse’ piercing is not inconsistent 
with nor antithetical to the salutary purposes of traditional piercing.”47  
Believing that the control and equity prongs, when properly applied, 
could produce equally just results in reverse piercing cases, the court 
held that the two-prong test should apply just as readily to reverse 
piercing.48  Lest there be any doubt about nuances differentiating the 
two versions of piercing, the court provided one of the most definite 
statements yet written about the handling of reverse piercing: “[t]he 
direction of the piercing is immaterial where the general rule has been 
met.”49 
The Easton standard was recognized as law in New York when it was 
adopted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in American Fuel Corp. 
v. Utah Energy Development Co.50  American Fuel sought to use the 
reverse piercing doctrine not for a collection of damages, but to bind 
Utah Energy to an arbitration agreement signed by its president, Robert 
Nead, as part of an employment agreement with American Fuel.51  
Although the American Fuel court reversed the lower court and refused 
to pierce the corporate veil in reverse, it did so because it found that the 
two-prong test had not been satisfied.52  Specifically, the presence of a 
co-founder with equal involvement negated allegations of Nead’s 
 44. 169 Misc. 2d 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).  While only a lower court decision, Easton was 
recognized by the Second Circuit as representing New York law, and has since been cited numerous 
times as the guiding precedent in reverse piercing cases.  See Am. Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., 
122 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Spinnell v. J.P. Morgan, 59 A.D.3d 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009); Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro v. Kane, 6 A.D.3d 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
 45. People v. Brooklyn Psychosocial Rehab. Inst., 585 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
 46. Easton, 169 Misc. 2d at 283.  While Easton did not personally own any portion of the 
corporations, the entirety of their stock was owned by his infant children, who graciously allowed him to 
act as president.  Id. at 284. 
 47. Id. at 289. 
 48. Id. at 289–90. 
 49. Id. at 290. 
 50. Am. Fuel, 122 F.3d at 130.  New York law was relied on in spite of the fact that the 
defendant was incorporated in Utah because “[a]t oral argument, both parties stressed that the law of 
New York and Utah is virtually identical regarding piercing of the corporate veil, and we follow their 
lead.”  Id. at 134.  This is slightly ironic given the interpretation of Utah law by the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals. 
 51. Id. at 131. 
 52. Id. at 134–35. 
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absolute control, and the specifics of the alleged breach of contract were 
not sufficiently fraudulent or wrongful.53  The court unequivocally held 
that “New York law recognizes ‘reverse’ piercing,”54 and has since been 
cited for that proposition.55 
As exemplified by these cases, the simplest and most intuitive 
approach to reverse piercing cases is a straightforward application of the 
traditional veil piercing test that predated reverse piercing cases and is 
still widely accepted.56  The result is an analysis that focuses exclusively 
on the conduct and status of the party sued to determine if the party has 
control over the corporation and if equity dictates relief beyond the 
assets of that party. 
B. The Tenth Circuit Doctrine—The Disposition of Reverse Piercing 
Far from the strict application of the traditional two-prong test 
preferred in New York, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has been a 
leading proponent of severely limiting reverse piercing, or even 
eliminating it altogether.  A seminal case arguing against reverse 
piercing of the corporate veil is Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. 
Banks,57 which arose from a dispute between parties with partial 
interests in an underperforming gold mine in Eastern California.58  The 
plaintiff, Cascade Energy & Metals Corporation (Cascade), was 
primarily owned by W. David Weston.59  After purchasing the 
goldmine, Cascade entered into a joint venture with two other 
corporations partially owned and controlled by Weston and Cascade.60  
Working interests were then sold to thirty-five individual investors, who 
agreed to provide working costs and pay royalties for the product of the 
mine.61  When production at the mine remained below expected levels 
and continued losing money, Cascade initiated the suit against individual 
investors who refused to pay further assessments that Weston had 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 134. 
 55. See, e.g., Ammirato v. Duraclean Int’l, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 210, 220 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).  
Some New York courts continue to cite Easton rather than American Fuel.  See, e.g., Spinnell v. J.P. 
Morgan, 59 A.D.3d 361, 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 56. These are far from the only jurisdictions to, in at least some circumstances, apply the simple 
two-prong test.  See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(citing Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1985)); Emmons v. 
Hometown Builders, No. CV-09-046, 2010 Me. Super. LEXIS 84 (Me. Super. Sep. 21, 2010). 
 57. 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 58. Id. at 1563. 
 59. Id. at 1561–62. 
 60. Id. at 1564. 
 61. Id. 
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informed them were necessary to continue operating the mine.62  The 
investors countered that Weston had fraudulently misdirected Cascade’s 
funds for personal use and committed securities violations.63  After a 
series of cross- and counter-claims, virtually all the parties with an 
interest in the mine became a party to the suit, as well as various 
companies partially or totally owned and controlled by Weston.64 
The relevant portion of the district court’s decision held that Weston 
and the Weston Companies were jointly and severally liable for the 
wrongful actions of Weston.65  The basis of the holding was that the 
companies were mere alter egos of Weston, justifying a reverse veil-
piercing to reach the assets of each controlled corporation.66  The Tenth 
Circuit reversed the lower court, providing several reasons to reject the 
theory of reverse piercing altogether: (1) the presumption is that the 
corporate form should not be disregarded; (2) reverse piercing would 
unnecessarily bypass traditional judgment collection procedures; (3) 
innocent shareholders of the corporations would be harmed; and (4) 
there are traditional, well-established theories of law that accomplish the 
same goals without the need to recognize a duplicative new theory of 
reverse piercing.67 
While these arguments presented clear reasons to abandon reverse 
piercing, the court fell short of plainly holding reverse piercing should 
never be recognized by also arguing that it should not apply to the 
specific facts in the case.  Namely, the court held that the Weston 
Corporations were sufficiently distinct from their owner, that they could 
not be termed alter egos, that Weston’s ownership of other companies 
was not instrumental in the fraud he perpetuated, and that reverse 
piercing was less appropriate in consensual relationships than in the 
context of torts.68 
The Tenth Circuit again provided a clear condemnation of reverse 
piercing in Floyd v. IRS.69  Thomas Bridges was the sole shareholder 
and director of two corporations, each of which paid Bridges’s salary to 
 62. Id. at 1566. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  These companies in which Weston had a controlling interest in shall hereafter be referred 
to as the “Weston Companies.” 
 65. Id. at 1574. 
 66. While this exact phraseology was not used by the lower court, the Cascade court 
extrapolated this basis from the underdeveloped analysis of why joint and several liability was 
appropriate.  Id. at 1575. 
 67. Id. at 1576–77. 
 68. Id. at 1577–78. 
 69. 151 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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a third corporation he controlled.70  The IRS, the State of Kansas, and a 
group of judgment creditors all asserted claims against Bridges and his 
companies, giving rise to a dispute over priority.71  In particular, the 
parties asked the Court to determine if priority rights to the Bridges 
Companies’ assets could be obtained through a tax lien against Bridges 
using a reverse piercing theory, as the lower court had determined.72 
In reversing the lower court decision, the Floyd court began by 
referring back to the lines of reasoning set forth in Cascade before 
adding new arguments in opposition to reverse piercing.73  The court 
noted that reverse piercing makes it possible (as occurred in the present 
case) for business creditors to have their rights subsumed by creditors of 
an individual shareholder.74  In addition to being unfair to those 
creditors who could not predict losing priority in such a manner, the 
court also predicted that it could damage businesses ability to obtain 
credit as a result of the greater fear of losing 75
This doctrine can be identified as one unique to the Tenth Circuit, 
even more so than its constituent states individually.  While both 
Cascade and Floyd were framed as interpretations of governing state 
law76—Utah and Kansas, respectively—a superficial analysis shows that 
little input from state courts was considered.  In fact, the Floyd court 
acknowledged that the Kansas Supreme Court recognized reverse 
piercing, but reasoned that this holding was limited to a jurisdictional 
context.77  Similarly, the court in Cascade referred to the Utah Supreme 
Court’s decision in Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc.78 only to 
quote it calling reverse piercing “little-recognized.”79  The Cascade 
court chose not to mention that the Messick court went on to apply the 
traditional two-prong veil piercing test and deny the reverse piercing 
only because the alter ego test was not satisfied.80 
 70. Id. at 1296.  These companies shall hereafter be referred to as the “Bridges Companies.” 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1297. 
 73. Id. at 1299. 
 74. Id. (citing In re Hamilton, 186 B.R. 991, 1000 (Bankr. D. Col. 1995)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990); Floyd, 
151 F.3d at 1299.  Subsequent Tenth Circuit cases likewise refused to allow veil piercing claims “[i]n 
the absence of a clear statement” by state courts on the matter.  See In re Denton, No. 99-6059, 2000 
Colo. J. C.A.R. 524 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 2000) (unpublished) (The court’s decision is also referenced in a 
“Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing at 203 F.3d 834 (10th Cir. 2000).). 
 77. Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1299 n.4 (citing Fahra v. Signal Cos., 532 P.2d 1330 (Kan. 1975), 
modified, 535 P.2d 463 (Kan. 1975)). 
 78. 678 P.2d 791 (Utah 1984). 
 79. Cascade, 896 F.2d at 1575 n.17. 
 80. Messick, 678 P.2d at 794–95. 
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Whether it be termed the ruling law of Utah, Kansas, or the Tenth 
Circuit itself, the precedent established in Cascade and Floyd provides 
an even simpler framework for deciding on claims of reverse piercing: 
under all circumstances, deny.  The Tenth Circuit clearly sees the ample 
legal alternatives to reverse piercing as superior to the risk of damage to 
third parties with an unprotected interest in the assets of a besieged 
corporation.  Many of the same concerns voiced in Cascade and Floyd 
can be found (individually or in some combination) in the cases 
discussed in the following subpart. 
C. The State of the Law—Divergent Application of Reverse Piercing 
If the two-prong test and the Tenth Circuit doctrine can be seen as 
opposite ends of the spectrum, state courts and the federal courts 
applying their law have explored nearly every shade in between.  Each 
jurisdiction attempting to find the proper rule of law—or at least proper 
resolution of the case at bar—has looked at different factors in 
determining where to draw the line between acceptable and 
unacceptable reverse piercing of the corporate veil.  The result in some 
cases is not a clear test at all, but merely one or more factors deemed 
relevant in that particular case.  In order to provide an overall picture of 
the legal landscape, it is necessary to look at the divergent circumstances 
that have swayed jurisdictions on whether reverse piercing is an 
acceptable practice. 
In McCall Stock Farms, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit focused heavily on whether the entities involved 
were alter egos of each other.81  John and Phyllis McCall were the sole 
proprietors of the McCall Stock Farms, Inc. (MSFI), in which they 
invested a loan made to them by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA).82  When the McCalls defaulted, the SBA attempted to collect by 
offsetting payments made to MSFI by the Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service, a Department of Agriculture program.83  The 
court’s analysis consisted mainly of delineating the ways in which the 
McCalls had ignored proper corporate form.84 
 81. 14 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  The court intentionally declined to distinguish whether its 
ruling was made under Iowa or federal common law, viewing them as the same on the relevant issues.  
Id. at 1569 n.6. 
 82. Id. at 1564. 
 83. Id. at 1564–65. 
 84. Id. at 1569 (“It is undisputed that MSFI had no savings account, no financial reserves, no 
investments, and no assets apart from a few pick-up trucks.  All the land subject to MSFI’s operations 
was casually leased to it without formal instruments, and all the farm equipment was owned personally 
by the McCalls and leased to MSFI.  No capital was invested in the corporation.  The individuals made 
12
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The McCall court did not analyze whether the corporation was being 
used to perpetuate a fraud or inequity or make an explicit finding on the 
equity prong.  While the court explained that even traditional veil 
piercing required only constructive and not actual fraud, the court did 
not delineate how the facts of the case represented even constructive 
fraud.85  The McCall decision simplifies the two-prong test to a single 
prong by relying solely on a finding that one party was the alter ego of 
another, even if the controlled entity was not used in a fraudulent 
manner.86 
A similar but far more restrictive test has been recently applied by 
California courts.  California courts have a broad policy prohibiting 
reverse piercing to reach corporate assets.87  In In re Schwarzkopf,88 the 
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals showcased the narrow exception to 
California’s general policy against reverse piercing of the corporate 
veil.89  According to the court, trusts determined to be the alter ego of 
the debtor lose their status as independent legal entities.90  As a result, 
the assets of an alter ego trust (and no other corporate entity) are 
vulnerable to reverse piercing under current California law.91 
McCall may also be considered as an example of deference to the 
collection of debts by the government.  Courts appear to be least 
resistant when the matter involves collecting taxes from a trust or other 
entity in which the delinquent taxpayer has a controlling interest.92  In 
United States v. Bigalk, the government attempted to collect estate taxes 
it found owing from a farm the defendants allegedly transferred 
fraudulently to a trust prior to the owner’s death.93  The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Minnesota stated that it was to “look to state law 
when determining whether an entity is the alter ego of a taxpayer.”94  
loans to the corporation that were never repaid.  These loans to MSFI were not formally documented, 
had no terms of payment, and bore no interest.  MSFI never paid its corporate officers any salary or 
other compensation.  The corporation never declared any dividends.  Mr. and Mrs. McCall made all the 
decisions regarding the corporation’s farm business.”). 
 85. Id. at 1568. 
 86. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp v. Almodovar, 671 F. Supp. 851 (D.P.R. 1987). 
 87. See, e.g., Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1512–13 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
 88. No. 08-56974, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24046 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 89. Id. at *12 (citing Postal Instant Press, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 1512). 
 90. Id. at *12–*13 (citing Wood v. Elling Corp., 572 P.2d 755, 762 (Cal. 1977)). 
 91. Id. at *13. 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Boscaljon, No. CIV.07-4111, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26980 
(D.S.D. Mar. 22, 2010); Century Hotels v. United States, 952 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1992) (disregarding that 
Louisiana precedents did not recognize reverse piercing claims). 
 93. 654 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 94. Id. at 994. 
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Defendants cited Minnesota law that reverse piercing was not 
accepted.95  The court did not dispute the validity of reverse piercing 
under Minnesota law, but rather held that “[r]everse piercing is a well-
established theory in the federal tax realm.”96 
The deference to the government in tax cases may also be explained 
by the reasoning that avoiding tax payments is itself sufficient to satisfy 
the equity prong.97  This reasoning, however, is not as often applied to 
hiding assets when a government agency is not involved.98  Compared 
to federal agencies, bankruptcy trustees have faced a much more mixed 
reception when trying to reach assets of a third party corporation owned 
by the debtor prior to filing for bankruptcy.  In re Schuster99 addressed a 
trustee attempting to reach assets of the North Scooter Inn.  The debtor 
had given his wife his one-half interest in the corporation a year prior to 
filing for bankruptcy.100  Similar to the reasoning in the tax evasion 
cases, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota held that 
reverse piercing should be allowed—and the opposing motion to dismiss 
denied—because allowing the debtor to shield his assets by hiding them 
in a corporation until the debt was discharged would itself be 
inequitable.101  This may explain why other districts have allowed 
reverse piercing in bankruptcy disputes even when it is undisputed that 
the debtor did not intend to defraud any creditors and when the formal 
elements of a fraudulent conveyance are not addressed.102 
In Daily v. Lilipuna Associates,103 the Ninth Circuit acknowledged 
this “prevailing trend” of bankruptcy courts permitting reverse piercing 
claims.104  The court, however, dismissed the claim before it as the 
debtor was not a shareholder when he filed for bankruptcy, which the 
 95. Id. at 995. 
 96. Id. (quoting United States v. Scherping, 187 F.3d 796, 803 (8th Cir. 1999); cf. Century 
Hotels, 952 F.2d at 110 (citing Owens & Sons, Inc. v. Guastella East, Inc., 354 So. 2d 571 (La. Ct. App. 
1977) (distinguishing state case law opposed to reverse piercing by saying it did not render a decision on 
the relevant issue, contrary to a plain reading of the case)). 
 97. Brownfield Inv. Corp., Nev. v. United States, 74 A.F.T.R. 2d (RIA) 5452 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(unpublished) (The court’s decision is also referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported 
Opinions” appearing at 28 F.3d 105 (9th Cir. 1994).). 
 98. See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
avoidance of a judicially imposed recovery was not on its own sufficient to satisfy the equity prong); 
Thomsen Family Trust v. Peterson Family Enters., 989 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding 
transfer of stock in a family farm to a trust that the debtor owned 98% of on the basis that the 
corporation was not involved in any wrongdoing). 
 99. 132 B.R. 604 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991). 
 100. Id. at 606. 
 101. Id. at 612. 
 102. See In re Mass, 178 B.R. 626, 630 (M.D. Pa. 1995). 
 103. No. 95-16370, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8391 (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 1996). 
 104. Id. at *10. 
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court believed to be a controlling factor in similar cases.105  The court 
was not moved by the fact that the debtor’s shares had simply been 
transferred to his children for allegedly less than reasonable value.106 
Government agencies and bankruptcy trustees are not the only class 
of plaintiffs held to a different standard in deciding reverse piercing 
issues.  A Connecticut Superior Court in Stotz v. Everson107 dismissed a 
reverse piercing claim arising from a lease.  The corporation to be 
pierced occupied the space originally leased by one of its owners, John 
Everson, who had ceased making payments under the lease.108  The 
court differentiated between tort claimants and those bringing an action 
such as breach of contract, stating that it had “serious reservations about 
granting equitable relief in what is essentially a breach of contract 
action.”109  Because the plaintiff’s claim was a breach of a lease, a pure 
contract claim, the court held that exceptional circumstances would be 
required to find that an equitable remedy such as reverse piercing was 
warranted.110 
In some jurisdictions, particular interest is paid to the potential for 
collateral damage to innocent third parties, stock holders in particular.  
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota in United States 
v. Boscaljon, gave relatively wide approval to reverse piercing, but 
specified that it was appropriate only “when no innocent individual 
would be harmed thereby.”111  This requirement was supported, albeit in 
less strong terms, by the Supreme Court of Nevada in LFC Marketing 
Group, Inc. v. Loomis,112 which upheld a lower court’s decision to 
permit reverse piercing in reliance upon the finding that the innocent 
shareholder of the corporation would not be harmed by forfeiting its 
assets for the debt of a vice president with no direct ownership of the 
corporation.113 
Some courts have attempted to determine reverse piercing claims 
solely through the application of agency law.  In Flight Services Group 
v. Patten Corp., Patten, a defendant in a suit over the sale of an airplane, 
 105. Id. at *10–*12. 
 106. Id. at *4.  Accord In re Hamilton, 186 B.R. 991 (Bankr. D. Col. 1995). 
 107. No. CV94 06 29 06, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3106 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1994). 
 108. Id. at *1. 
 109. Id. at *3. 
 110. Id. 
 111. United States v. Boscaljon, No. CIV.07-4111, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26980, at *12 (D.S.D. 
Mar. 22, 2010). 
 112. 8 P.3d 841 (Nev. 2000). 
 113. Id. at 847.  The Nevada Supreme Court, while mentioning the need to protect innocent 
shareholders, did not further examine the district court’s finding that attaching $25,000 in accounts 
payable to a corporation solely owned by an innocent party would not harm that owner. 
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brought a counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty based on actions in 
the operation of a third company, Berkshire.114  Two of Flight Services 
Group’s (FSG) owners had an ownership interest in Berkshire as well.115  
The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed the 
counterclaim on the basis of agency law, stating that “[i]t does not make 
sense to impose liability on an agent for the actions of the principal 
where the agent is not otherwise liable.”116  FSG, the agent, was not 
responsible for the actions of its principals to the extent they affected 
another entity. 
Another factor of interest for some courts has been the number of 
steps in between the individual and the corporation alleged to be an alter 
ego.  In Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, the government looked to 
collect taxes due from Fadhalla and Muneera Haeri out of the assets of 
Dar Al-Hikmah, incorporated in the Netherlands, and Mudin Inc., a 
domestic corporation.117  Both corporations were controlled by the 
Haeris and owned by the Haeri Trust, and their sole function was to own 
property that was freely used by the Haeris without a lease or other 
formal agreement.118  The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed 
a strong belief that a piercing was justified because the corporation’s 
assets were freely used by and intermingled with the property of the 
Haeris, yet remanded the case without allowing a reverse piercing.  The 
trial court had determined control of the corporations by the Haeri Trust, 
but had not made a direct finding regarding the Haeris’ control of the 
trust.119 
The Zahra court relied in part on a decision by a Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals, George v. Houston Boxing Club, Inc.120  The dispute in George 
was an alleged breach of contract, for which George sought relief from 
K.S. Adams.121  Adams advanced all the money used to start the 
Houston Boxing Club (HBC), was not repaid for this “loan,” and 
received all of the remaining assets when HBC was dissolved.122  While 
he was not technically the owner, Adams held all of HBC’s stock in trust 
for his children.123  The court, in stating that the alter-ego test had not 
been satisfied, noted that “we find no Texas cases applying the alter ego 
 114. 963 F. Supp. 158 (D. Conn. 1997). 
 115. Id. at 159. 
 116. Id. at 160. 
 117. 910 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 38 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 118. Id. at 241–42. 
 119. Id. at 246. 
 120. 423 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App. 1967). 
 121. Id. at 129. 
 122. Id. at 131. 
 123. Id. 
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doctrine to a situation where the individual owned none of the 
outstanding stock.”124  The George court simply held that the use of a 
trust nominally shifting ownership is sufficient to defeat the control test.  
The court declined to take the extra step of analyzing why Adams’s 
control over the trust was insufficient to establish control. 
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. CMC Construction Co.,125 the 
determining factor was not the formalities of the trust, but the form of 
the relationship between the debtor and the party being pierced.  Tara 
Asher, the debtor, had transferred $400,000 into Asher Investments 
Partnership (AIP), which Hartford Fire Insurance Company wanted to 
reach.126  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee 
did not need to examine the relationship between Asher and AIP beyond 
determining that Asher was a natural person and shareholder in AIP.127  
Tennessee courts, the court explained, recognize reverse piercing only to 
reach a subsidiary’s assets based on the debts of a parent corporation.128  
An individual shareholder engaging in acts indistinguishable from those 
that would justify reverse piercing in a parent/subsidiary situations 
would thus have no liability under Tennessee law, and reverse piercing 
was not allowed in Hartford.129 
Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro v. Kane130 added an additional 
element to the equity prong: the purpose of incorporation.  One of the 
defendants, Amy Kane, had an outstanding debt to two law firms.131  
After incurring the first debt but before initial judgment was rendered on 
either, Kane and her husband incorporated Gin Properties, Inc., which 
they used to purchase a residence for themselves.132  The Appellate 
Division of the New York Supreme Court made a point of noting that 
the corporation was formed knowing of the outstanding debts and 
seemingly in order to avoid satisfaction of any judgment on those debts 
by hiding the couple’s joint assets.133  While the court did not treat this 
 124. Id. at 132.  As the court did not find a breach of contract, this finding falls under the category 
of dicta, but it has been no less relied on as the reference to it in Zahra shows. 
 125. No. 3:06-CV-11, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86826 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 2010). 
 126. Id. at *7–*9.  Hartford also brought a claim under the Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act regarding the same transaction, which the court did not render a decision on.  Id. at *65. 
 127. Id. at *67–68. 
 128. Id. at *67 (citing Cont’l Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625, 632–33 
(Tenn. 1979)). 
 129. Id. at *68. 
 130. 6 A.D.3d 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
 131. The first law firm represented her in her duties as executrix of a will, and the second was 
retained to help her defend a suit against the first for unpaid fees.  After a settlement of the first debt was 
negotiated, Kane refused to pay either party.  Id. at 73–74. 
 132. Id. at 74. 
 133. Id. at 78. 
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as mandatory, it is an easier analysis when the very formation of the 
corporation appears fraudulent.134 
Some courts, without directly outlining a scenario under which 
reverse piercing is permissible, share the Tenth Circuit’s preference for 
utilizing traditional judgment collection methods wherever possible.135  
In Owens & Sons, Inc. v. Guastella East, Inc.,136 a creditor sued the 
Guastella East corporation on a promissory note signed only by its 
owners.137  The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that if the owners 
were found to be titleholders to the assets sought, they could be levied 
directly.138  Alternatively, the plaintiff could receive the benefits of the 
corporation’s assets by selling the owners’ shares and using the proceeds 
to pay the debt.139  Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the trial 
court and found Guastella East not liable for the debt of its owners.140 
While inconsistent, the approaches taken in the various jurisdictions 
all share a desire to find an equitable solution to the disputes before 
them.  Of course, the courts are limited to the factual situation and 
arguments before them, which can detract from the development of a 
coherent doctrine.  A consistent analysis of all the rights and interests 
involved in reverse piercing is lacking from the current case law.  
Without considering the precedential value of a particular test when 
applied to the variety of situations in which reverse piercing attempts 
may arise, later courts are left either to misapply the doctrine or rely on 
different reasoning in every instance where the claim arises.  In order to 
encourage a comprehensive analysis of reverse piercing, Part IV will put 
the reasoning provided by various courts into a broader context to 
determine what the appropriate approach to reverse piercing should be. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Assuming there is one overarching solution to handling this type of 
claim that can be evenly and fairly used, the analysis that leads to it must 
 134. See also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp v. Almodovar, 671 F. Supp. 851, 878 (D.P.R. 1987) 
(“Otherwise, manifest injustice would result from treating Vilmasor and Lumaral as separate entities 
when in fact they have merely been personal business conduits of the defendant used and designed for 
the only purpose of hindering, defrauding and delaying the creditors of Martinez and Amieiro.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Stoltz v. Emerson, No. CV94 06 29 06, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3106, at *4 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1994). 
 136. 354 So. 2d 571 (La. 1977). 
 137. The plaintiff claimed the defendant corporation had signed the note, but this was erroneous.  
Id. 
 138. Id. at 572. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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be found in drawing out the reasoning the above jurisdictions have given 
for the stance they take on reverse piercing.  Broadly, these rationales 
can be grouped into two categories: an analysis of available alternatives 
in the law and a look at the impact various stances would have on the 
rights of all parties potentially affected.  This Comment proceeds by 
looking at the reasoning within these categories and determining how 
well they apply to the unique situation of reverse piercing of the 
corporate veil. 
A. Misuse of an Equitable Doctrine—The Alternatives to Reverse 
Piercing 
Central to the holdings of Cascade and Floyd is that reverse piercing 
is not used because it is a necessary evil, but perhaps in spite of the fact 
that more clearly defined and traditionally accepted alternatives exist.  
This can be done either through measures after achieving judgment on 
the underlying complaint or adding the target corporation as a defendant 
under a different charge. 
Plaintiffs who bring and win a suit against any defendant are able, 
even without reverse piercing, to take advantage of the assets of a 
wholly or partially owned and controlled corporation.  Traditional 
judgment collection procedures allow for the creditor following 
judgment to levy the assets of the defendant, including shares in a 
corporation not named in the suit.141  While there is certainly a danger 
that the corporation will attempt to shift its assets in order to avoid such 
a judgment, alternative methods of combating this secondary fraud 
already exist.  In addition to seeking attachment of the interest prior to 
litigating the suit, judgment creditors can protect collection through 
applicable fraudulent transfer laws.142  In the area of tax collection, these 
laws have been of particular interest to some courts in applying reverse 
piercing.143  Treating transfers as constructive dividends allows some 
additional access to these assets of the corporation.144 
Forcing collection to go through the traditional channels would be 
 141. But see Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 312 n.14 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2002) (finding that an attempt to attach distributions from the corporation would have been fruitless as 
the defendant simply used corporation assets to pay her debts, but not commenting on other judgment 
collection methods). 
 142. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Almodovar, 671 F. Supp. 851, 881 (D.P.R. 1987) (finding the 
transfer rescindable as fraudulent after finding the same subject assets recoverable through reverse 
piercing). 
 143. See United States v. Bigalk, 654 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 144. Floyd v. Internal Revenue Serv., 151 F.3d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 1998); see also 10 JACOB 
MERTENS, JR. ET AL., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 38B:71 (2005). 
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advantageous to many parties involved in such a dispute directly or 
indirectly.  Where there are other shareholders in the target corporation, 
traditional collection strikes the best balance for protecting their interests 
and rewarding the judgment creditor.  Whether the creditor takes control 
of the shares or they are sold to a third party with the proceeds going the 
creditor, the shares become an asset.  The new holder would have an 
incentive to make economically rational decisions that benefit the 
corporation or resell the shares for value.  Even if the new owner used 
majority ownership to force dissolution, other shareholders would be 
guaranteed their proportional share of the dissolved corporation.  There 
would be no risk of innocent third parties losing their entire investment 
because essential assets were sold off to pay the debts of a majority 
owner. 
Where creditors would be rightfully wary of relying on the sometimes 
arduous judgment collection process, there are alternative legal theories 
that would allow corporations to be joined as defendants without using 
an unpredictable reverse piercing approach.  Namely, counts raised 
against the corporation for aiding and abetting or under general agency 
principals could succeed under similar circumstances to those present in 
many reverse piercing cases.  While the burden of proof on these counts 
would make collection potentially more difficult than simple judgment 
collection, it would be similar to the extant control test.  As this requires 
that plaintiffs establish a link between the conduct that is the subject 
matter of the suit and the corporation itself, voluntary creditors would be 
able to protect themselves through investigation of the corporation prior 
to entering into any contractual relationship. 
Perhaps the most important advantage of these alternatives to reverse 
piercing is that they are more true to the purposes of equitable remedies 
in our legal system.  As many courts have noted, reverse piercing is an 
equitable doctrine.145  Therefore, it should be allowed exclusively where 
the requesting party is without an equivalent remedy at law.146  As this 
Subpart has demonstrated, there are alternative methods of achieving 
similar results within the court, and each may have benefits as compared 
to reverse piercing of the corporate veil.  In the absence of any 
compelling reason to continue allowing reverse piercing beyond the 
convenience of judgment creditors, reverse piercing should be set aside 
in favor of alternative, well-established legal remedies. 
 145. See, e.g., Schimmelpenninck v. Byrne, 183 F.3d 347, 358 n.21 (5th Cir. 1999); McKinney v. 
Gannett Co., 817 F.2d 659, 666 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 146. Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1300; see also 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 41.25, at 162–66 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 2006). 
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B. The Rights of the Parties Under Reverse Piercing 
1. The Principal Actors—Judgment Creditors and Wrongdoing 
Defendants 
As demonstrated above, the deceptive fiction beneath reverse piercing 
is that it is identical to the traditional situation and can thus be handled 
in the same manner, a fallacy fueled by a myopic focus on the principal 
parties.  Indeed, both traditional and reverse piercing of the corporate 
veil act as mechanisms to transfer wealth from a dishonest defendant 
found liable for wrong doing to a valiant judgment creditor.  There is no 
obvious public policy reason to prevent this transfer, and various 
equitable reasons that it should be facilitated in the face of a party’s 
fraudulent attempt to avoid liability by shuffling assets.  As the cast of 
characters with an interest in the transfer becomes more diverse, as will 
be shown below, this rationale becomes much more convoluted. 
Even in a scenario where there are no third parties to be affected by 
the transaction, reverse piercing is still fundamentally an equitable 
doctrine.147  As such, it should only be applied where legal remedies are 
unavailable or inadequate to protect the interests of creditors who are 
seeking to pierce the corporate veil.148  As previously illustrated, a 
variety of state statutory and common law mechanisms are available to 
achieve the same ends, many of which are more widely recognized and 
have been for some time.  To the extent that fraudulent transfer statutes 
or attachment of the defendant’s shares would equally resolve the 
dispute, reverse piercing is therefore inappropriate even if the rights of 
third parties would not be affected. 
2. Innocent Bystanders—The Uninvolved Shareholder 
For traditional piercing, it is comparatively simple to protect the 
interests of innocent shareholders in a corporation used for fraudulent or 
illegal acts by a single controlling owner.  In an ideal situation, placing 
liability on the owner rather than the corporation could make protection 
of shareholders a primary purpose rather than secondary effect.149  The 
mechanism for ensuring that the liability is extended only to responsible 
parties is the control test, which examines the degree of control 
exercised over the corporation by a single shareholder. 
 147. Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1300 (citing McKinley, 817 F.2d at 666). 
 148. Id. (citing WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 146, § 41.25, at 653). 
 149. But see D’Ambrosi v. Bayly Martin & Fay Int’l, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 5368, 1987 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7946 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 2, 1987) (holding that New York law requires a corporation’s assets to be 
exhausted before piercing the corporate veil to collect against shareholders or a parent corporation). 
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In the context of a reverse piercing, however, a direct application of 
the control test could lead to a grotesque misapplication of the law.  
Several courts considering traditional piercing have held that complete 
ownership is not a requirement; a mere significant interest and control of 
the corporation’s operations suffice.150  To apply this in the context of 
reverse piercing would not protect other shareholders, but expose them 
to an even greater degree to damages from the actions of another 
stakeholder.151 
Long term, the investment patterns of individuals could come to 
reflect this danger.  A primary advantage of the corporate form is the 
safety it provides from the overlap of individual and corporate debts.  
Traditional piercing is resisted except in exceptional cases in order to 
preserve this dichotomy, and the advantages of the separation flow both 
ways.  Investors in a business expect it to be relatively safe.  Any risk in 
the investment should ideally be ascertainable by due diligence into the 
individual business’s practices as well as the industry overall.  Reverse 
piercing would require investors to acknowledge risk in the form of 
unscrupulous owners.  The result could be a retreat from small and mid-
size enterprises in favor of investing in publicly traded companies with 
significantly lower risks of piercing.152 
In order to prevent this misapplication, courts would, at a minimum, 
need to treat the existence of innocent shareholders as a separate and 
absolutely dispositive consideration when determining if reverse 
piercing is appropriate.153  In C.F. Trust, the Virginia Supreme Court 
provided a precedent for this, holding that it is the burden of the party 
moving for reverse piercing to prove that innocent shareholders will not 
be affected and to do so by clear and convincing evidence.154 
As explained above, an alternative to reverse piercing is to force 
parties to attach the shares or ownership interest in the corporation.  
Where there are minority shareholders, they would have an opportunity 
to purchase a greater interest or at least a guarantee that a new holder of 
 150. Telenor Mobile Commc’ns v. Storm LLC, 587 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
351 F. App’x 467 (2nd Cir. 2009) (“A company that owns a majority stake in another controls that 
company’s operations, even if it does not have 100% ownership.”). 
 151. See United States v. Boscaljon, No. CIV.07-4111, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26980 (D.S.D. 
Mar. 22, 2010). 
 152. The lower risk is a result of diverse ownership, which makes satisfaction of the control prong 
much more difficult and allows for broader oversight that can check behaviors likely to be egregious 
enough to trigger the equity prong.  This also follows with the trend in traditional piercing.  See 
Thompson, supra note 11, at 1047–48 (finding no successful piercing of a public corporation in an 
empirical analysis of 1,583 cases involving an attempt to pierce the corporate veil). 
 153. See, e.g., Boscaljon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26980. 
 154. C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P’ship., 580 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 2003). 
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the shares will have an interest in making economically viable decisions 
about the corporation’s assets.  Even a corporation dissolved by a new 
majority owner would have its assets distributed in a predictable manner 
among shareholders.  Minority shareholders would not find themselves 
with an interest in a corporation of significantly less value overnight due 
to a majority owner’s decision not to pay taxes. 
3. Undermined Contracts—The Usurped Creditor 
Like innocent shareholders, legitimate creditors of a corporation may 
have an interest in its continued and successful operation that is left 
unprotected in a dispute over reverse piercing.  These parties do not 
have a similar direct interest in the results of a traditional piercing of the 
corporate veil.  Parties extending credit to a corporation are capable of 
examining the financial health of the corporation as well as its 
outstanding debts.155  When owners of sole proprietorships or other 
small enterprises are asked to personally guarantee a business loan, the 
loaning institution goes into the transaction understanding that adverse 
actions of the individual could affect their interest and can modify the 
terms of any loan accordingly.  Conversely, a loaning institution would 
not expect assets loaned to a corporation alone to be sold off to pay the 
debts of its owner. 
Essentially, judgment creditors and victims of torts may be given 
preference over consensual creditors if reverse piercing is allowed with a 
simple two-prong test.  Indeed, reverse piercing could allow tort victims 
to receive assets before the consensual creditors of either the individual 
or the corporation.156  This is largely inconsistent with the common law 
treatment of traditional piercing, and precisely the reverse of many other 
legal areas, which are often more reserved when victims of torts attempt 
to gain the benefits of a corporation’s assets before its consensual 
creditors.157  Even in the case where the liability of the owner arises 
 155. Whether the inquiry is actually made is a separate issue that must be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis.  For example, the court in In re Mass allowed reverse piercing over the objection that it hurt 
consensual creditors of the corporation because there was no proof an actual inquiry into the financial 
strength of the corporation was made or relied on.  178 B.R. 626, 631 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 1995). 
 156. See supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text. 
 157. See generally G. Michael Epperson and Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder’s Ultimate 
Calamity: Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia, Maryland, 
and Virginia, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 632–33 (1988) (arguing that tort victims should be given 
preference in piercing of the corporate veil because they are unable to investigate and choose their 
judgment debtors, but noting that many courts have failed to make such a distinction); see also 
Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc. 895 N.E.2d 538, 545 (Ohio 2008) (“Insurer bad faith is a straightforward 
tort, a basic example of unjust conduct; it does not represent the type of exceptional wrong that piercing 
is designed to remedy.”); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966) (refusing to pierce the 
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from exceptional circumstances, it is not clear that the rationale would 
extend to reverse piercing unless the creditors of the corporation knew 
that this threat to the corporation’s assets was a possibility prior to 
initiating a contractual relationship. 
The most important aspect of this from the perspective of creditors is 
the predictability of having the corporation’s assets sold.  If reverse 
piercing is allowed, there would be no rational way to investigate a 
business and determine the risk it presents.  Reverse piercing is 
commonly invoked in purely personal cases, including satisfaction of tax 
debts158 and settling marital assets in a divorce.159 
There are multiple implications to this collateral attack on the rights 
of consensual creditors.  First, attachment of the corporate assets raises 
due process concerns with regard to creditors who have an interest in the 
assets as collateral.160  This is compounded by the fact that it could 
undermine state laws alerting creditors to the dissolution of a 
corporation.161  If creditors take steps to shield themselves from this 
increased risk, the result could be a general chilling of the ability of 
small businesses with few owners to receive financing.162  At the very 
least, lenders may begin through altered risk calculations to spread the 
cost of individual misdeeds across all small businesses.163 
Conversely, forcing parties to use traditional remedies does not 
present the same risks.  If shares in a corporation were sold rather than 
its assets, the purchaser would immediately obtain an interest in 
retaining the profitability of the corporation, protecting the investment of 
outside creditors.  Even to the extent that fraudulent transfer statutes 
would still allow access directly to corporate assets, this would be 
limited to assets not relied on in extending credit or that reasonable 
investigation may show are obtained through inappropriate means.  At 
the very least, it would provide creditors with a more settled body of law 
from which to calculate the risks inherent in lending. 
corporate veil of an undercapitalized taxi cab corporation for the victim of an accident); Robert B. 
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1058–59 
(1991). 
 158. See United States v. Bigalk, 654 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 159. See W.G. Platts, Inc. v. Platts, 298 P.2d 1107 (Wash. 1956); Lyons v. Lyons, 340 So. 2d 450 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1976). 
 160. In re Hamilton, 186 B.R. 991, 1000 (D. Col. 1995). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Floyd v. Internal Revenue Serv., 151 F.3d 1295, 1299 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 163. For a more thorough analysis in this vein in the context of Fourth Circuit decisions impacting 
Virginia’s appeal to small businesses, see Wendy B. Davis, The Failure of the Federal Courts to 
Support Virginia’s Reluctance to Pierce the Corporate Veil, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 203 
(2001). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Attempts to make compensation for those victorious in lawsuits easier 
are laudable, but it must be acknowledged that these actions rarely take 
place in a vacuum.  Any alteration to traditional judgment collections 
should be fully examined by courts to determine its impact not just on 
the parties to the case, but on other shareholders in or creditors of the 
company to be subject to reverse piercing.  The complexity of a 
corporation’s structure is exceeded in many cases only by the web of 
interactions it has.  Furthermore, any expansion of methods for 
accessing the assets of a corporation carries with it the risk of decreasing 
loans and investments to small businesses and the chilling of economic 
expansion that can incur.  This Comment suggests that the direct and 
indirect risks of reverse piercing are significant enough compared to the 
marginal benefits to judgment creditors to justify complete abandonment 
of the practice. 
The Tenth Circuit’s wary approach to piercing the corporate veil 
appears to be the correct one.  At the very least, jurisdictions must take 
care when deciding reverse piercing claims to ensure that all interests 
are protected and all alternatives are considered. 
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